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Abstract
In many practical situations, we need to make a group decision that
takes into account preferences of all the participants. Ideally, we should
elicit, from each participant, a full information about his/her preferences,
but such elicitation is usually too time-consuming to be practical. Instead, we only elicit, from each participant, his/her ranking of different
alternatives. One of the semi-heuristic methods for decision making under such information is Borda count, when for each alternative and each
participant, we count how many alternatives are worse, and then select
the alternatives for which the sum of these numbers is the largest. In this
paper, we explain the empirical success of the Borda count technique by
showing that this method naturally follows from the maximum entropy
approach – a natural approach to decision making under uncertainty.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Need for voting and group decision making. In many real-life situations,
we need to make a decision that affects many people. Ideally, when making this
decision, we should take into account the preferences of all the affected people.
This group decision making situation is also known as voting.
What information can be used for voting: from the simplest majority
voting to the most comprehensive situations. The simplest – and most
1

widely used – type of voting is when each person selects one of the possible
alternatives. After this selection, all we know is how many people voted for
each alternative.
Clearly, the more people vote for a certain alternative, the better is this
alternative for the community as a whole. Thus, if this is all the information
we have, and we do not plan to extract any additional information from the
participants, then a natural idea is to select the alternative that gathered the
largest number of votes. (Another idea is to keep only the alternatives with the
largest number of votes and vote again.)
In this scheme, for each person, we only take into account one piece of information: which alternative is preferable to this person. To make more adequate
decision, it is desirable to use more information about people’s preferences. An
ideal case is when we use full information about people’s preferences; we will
discuss this case in the following text. This is ideal but this requires too much
elicitation and is, thus, not used in practice.
An intermediate stage – when we use more information than in the simple
majority voting – is when we ask the participants to rank all the alternatives,
and use these rankings to make a decision.
Ranking-based voting: a brief reminder. The famous result by a Nobelist
Kenneth Arrow shows that it is not possible to have a ranking-based voting
scheme that would satisfy all reasonable fairness-related properties [14, 16, 17].
So what can we do?
One of the schemes used in such voting is the Borda count (see, e.g., [16, 17],
when for each participant i and for each alternative Aj , we count the number
bij of alternatives that the i-th participant ranked lower than Aj . Then, for
each alternative Aj , we add up the numbers corresponding to different participants, and we select the alternatives with the largest value of the corresponding
n
P
sum
bij .
i=1

Why Borda count? Borda count is often successfully used in practice. However, the fact that there are several other alternative schemes prompts a natural
question: why namely Borda count and why not one of these other schemes?
In this paper, we provide an explanation for the success of Borda count:
namely, we show that the Borda count (and its versions) naturally follow from
the maximum entropy approach – a known way for making decisions under
uncertainty.

2

What If We Have Complete Information About
the Preferences: Reminder

How to describe individual preferences. In order to describe what should
we do when only know the rankings, let us first recall what decision we should
make when we have full information about the preferences. To describe this, we
need to recall how to describe these preferences.
2

In decision theory (see, e.g., [4, 8, 13, 14, 15]), a user’s preferences are described by using the notion of utility. To define this notion, we need to select
two extreme alternatives:
• a very bad alternative A− which is worse than anything that we will
actually encounter, and
• a very good alternative A+ which is better than anything that we will
actually encounter.
For each number p from the interval [0, 1], we can then form a lottery L(p) in
which:
• we get A+ with probability p and
• we get A− with the remaining probability 1 − p.
Then:
• For p = 0, the lottery L(p) coincides with the very bad alternative A−
and is, thus, worse than any of the alternatives A that we encounter:
L(0) = A− < A.
• For p = 1, the lottery L(p) coincides with the very good alternative A+
and is, thus, better than any of the alternatives A that we encounter:
A < L(1) = A+ .
Clearly, the larger p, the better the lottery. Thus, there exists a threshold p0
such that:
• for p < p0 , we have A(p) < A, and
• for p > p0 , we have A < A(p).
This threshold is known as the utility of the alternative A; it is usually denoted
by u(A).
In particular, according to this definition:
• the very bad alternative A− has utility 0, while
• the very good alternative A+ has utility 1.
To fully describe people’s preferences, we need to elicit, from each person i,
this person’s utility ui (Aj ) of all possible alternatives Aj .
Utility is defined modulo linear transformations. The numerical value of
utility depends on the selection of values A− and A+ .
One can show that if we use a different pair of alternatives (A0− , A0+ ), then
the resulting new utility values u0 (A) are related to the original values u(A) by
a linear dependence: u0 (A) = k + ` · u(A) for some k and ` > 0.
3

Utility-based decision making under probabilistic uncertainty. In many
practical situations, we do not know the exact consequences of different actions.
For each action, we may have different consequences c1 , . . . , cm , with different utilities u(c1 ), . . . , u(cm ). We can also usually estimate the probabilities
p1 , . . . , pm of different consequences. What is the utility of this action?
This action is equivalent to selecting ci with probability pi . By definition
of utility, each consequence ci is, its turn, equivalent to a lottery in which we
get A+ with probability u(ci ) and A− with the remaining probability 1 − u(ci ).
Thus, the original action is equivalent to the corresponding two-stage lottery as
a result of which we get either A+ or A− .
One can easily conclude that the probability of getting A+ in this 2-stage
lottery is equal to the sum p1 · u(c1 ) + . . . + pm · u(cm ). Thus, by definition of
utility, this sum – which happens to be the expected value of utility – is the
utility of the corresponding action.
How to make a group decision: simplest choice situation. Once we
know the utility ui (Aj ) of each alternative Aj for each participant i, we need
to decide which alternative to select. Each alternative is thus characterized by
the tuple of the corresponding utility values (u1 (Aj ), . . . , un (Aj )). Based on
the tuples corresponding to different alternatives, we need to select the best
one. In other words, we need to be able, given two tuples (u1 (Aj ), . . . , un (Aj ))
and (u1 (Ak ), . . . , un (Ak )), to decide which of the two alternatives is better, i.e.,
whether
(u1 (Aj ), . . . , un (Aj )) < (u1 (Ak ), . . . , un (Ak ))
or
(u1 (Ak ), . . . , un (Ak )) < (u1 (Aj ), . . . , un (Aj )).
In the voting situation, there is usually a status quo state – a state that exists
right now and that will remain if we do not make any decision. For example, if
we are voting on different plans to decrease the traffic congestion in a city, the
status quo situation is not to do anything and to continue suffering traffic delays.
The status quo situation is worse than any of the alternatives. Thus, we can take
this status quo situation as the value A− . In this case, for all participants, the
utility of the status quo situation is 0. The only remaining freedom is selecting
A+ . If we replace the original very good alternative A+ with a new alternative
A0+ , then the corresponding linear transformation should transform 0 into 0 and
thus, should have the form u0i (A) = `i · ui (A).
In principle, each participant can select his/her own scale. It is reasonable
to require that the resulting group choice should not change if one of the participants selects a different option A+ . Thus, the corresponding order of the set of
all the tuples must satisfy the condition that if (u1 , . . . , un ) < (u01 , . . . , u0n ) then
(`1 ·u1 , . . . , `n ·un ) < (`1 ·u01 , . . . , `n ·u0n ). Other requirements include monotonicity (if an alternative is better for everyone it should be preferred) and fairness
(the order should not change is we simply rename the participants.)
It turns out that the only order with this property is the comparison of the
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products:
(u1 , . . . , un ) < (u01 , . . . , u0n ) ⇔

n
Y

ui <

i=1

n
Y

u0i .

i=1

This comparison is known as Nash’s bargaining solution after the Nobelist John
Nash [5, 13, 14].
How to make a group decision: case of transferable utility. The above
analysis refers to the case when we make a simple decision: e.g., when we simply
elect an official. In many other group decision situations, however, the situation
is more complicated. For example, some people may be opposed a road construction plan, since during this construction, their access to their homes and
businesses will be limited. In such situations, if this particular alternative seems
to be overall the best, a reasonable idea is to use some of its benefits to compensate those who will experience temporary inconveniences. The possibility of
such a compensation is known as transferable utility: in contrast to the above
simple choice situation, we can transfer utility from one participant to another.
The fact that we can move utility from one person to another means that now
we have a common unit for such a utility; so, when some utility is transferred,
the sum of all utilities remains constant. Suppose that without the transfers,
the utilities corresponding to some alternative are u1 , . . . , un . The possibility
of transfers means that we can have different values u01 , . . . , u0n – as long as the
n
n
P
P
sum of all the utilities remains the same:
ui =
u0i .
i=1

i=1

The optimal transfer corresponds, as before, to the case when the product of
the individual utilities attains the largest possible value. To find the resulting
utility values, we need, given the values u1 , . . . , un , to find the values u01 , . . . , u0n
n
Q
for which the product
u0i attains the largest possible value among all the
tuples for which

n
P
i=1

i=1

ui =

n
P

i=1

u0i . By applying the Lagrange multiplier method,

we can reduce this constraint optimization problem to the unconstraint problem
of optimizing the following objective function:
!
n
n
n
Y
X
X
u0i + λ ·
ui −
u0i .
i=1

i=1

i=1

0
Differentiating this expression with respect
Q 0 to each unknown
Q 0ui and equating
the derivative to 0, we conclude that
ui0 − λ = 0, i.e.,
ui0 = λ. Thus, for
i0 6=i

i0 6=i

each i, we have
n
Q

u0i

i0 =1

= Q

i0 6=i

n
Q

u0i0
u0i0

=

i0 =1

u0i0

λ

.

The right-hand side of this formula does not depend on i, thus we have
u01 = . . . = u0n .
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From the condition that

n
P

ui =

i=1

n
P
i=1

u0i , we conclude that

u01 = . . . = u0n =

n
1 X
·
ui
n i=1

and thus, that
n
Y
i=1

u0i

=

n
1 X
·
ui
n i=1

!n
.

Among several alternatives, we should select the one for which this product
is the largest – which is equivalent to selecting the alternative for which the sum
n
P
ui attains its largest possible value.
i=1

3

Let Us Apply These Formulas to RankingBased Voting

The problem of ranking-base voting: reminder. In the situation of
ranking-based voting, we do not know the utilities. All we know, for each
participant, is the ranking given by this participants to possible alternatives.
How can we apply the above formulas to this situation. Ranking
Ai1 < Ai2 < . . .
means that we can have different utility values u(Ai ) ∈ [0, 1] as long as these
utility values are consistent with this ranking, i.e., as long as
u(Ai1 ) < u(Ai2 ) < . . .
In line with the above description of decision making under uncertainty, to
find an actual utility of each alternative for this participant, we must find the
expected value of the corresponding utility u(Aj ). To find this expected value,
we need to select some probability distribution on the set of all possible tuples.
Maximum entropy approach: idea. There may be many different probability distributions on the set of all the property ordered tuples, we need to select
one of them. Some of these distributions may have more uncertainty, some less.
To select one of these distributions, a reasonable idea is to keep the original uncertainty and not to add artificial certainty – i.e., to select, among all possible
distributions, a distribution with the largest possible value of uncertainty. A
natural measure of this uncertainty is the entropy, so we select the distribution
with the largest possible value of the entropy; see, e.g., [6].
What happens when we apply the maximum entropy approach. In
our case, the largest possible entropy is attained for a uniform distribution on
6

the set of all the property sorted tuples. Thus, the utility of each alternative
is equal to the expected value of the corresponding utility under such uniform
distribution.
It is known (see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12]) that for k alternatives
Ai1 < Ai2 < . . . < Aik , the resulting expected utility values u(Aj ) take the
form
q
ui (Aiq ) =
.
k+1
For each alternative Aj = Aiq , its Borda count bij for this participant i – i.e., its
number of worse-then-Aj alternatives – is equal to bij = q −1. Thus, q = bij +1,
and in terms of this Borda count, the expected utility of each alternative Aj is
equal to
bij + 1
.
ui (Aj ) =
k+1
In the case of transferable utility, this explains the Borda count. For
transferable utility, as we have discussed in the previous section, we must select
n
P
the alternative Aj for which the sum
ui (Aj ) of the utilities is the largest
i=1

possible. In our case, this means that we compare the values
n
X

ui (Aj ) =

i=1

n
X
bij + 1
.
k+1
i=1

This sum is, in its turn, equal to
n
n
X
X
bij + 1
n
1
bij +
=
·
.
k
+
1
k
+
1
k
+
1
i=1
i=1

Thus, the largest value of this sum corresponds to the largest value of the Borda
n
P
sum
bij – so we arrive exactly at the Borda count approach to voting.
i=1

Comment: in the simplest selection case, we get a version of the Borda count.
It is worth mentioning that in the case of simple selection, we should use the
following version of Borda count – select the alternative Aj for which the product
n
Y

ui (Aj ) =

i=1

n
Y
bij + 1
k+1
i=1

attains the largest possible value. This, in its turn, is equivalent to maximizing
n
n
Q
P
the product
(bij + 1), or, alternatively, to maximizing the sum
ln(bij + 1).
i=1

i=1
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